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Shadow Banking and Bank Capital
Regulation
Guillaume Plantin
Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR
Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher
than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that
their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions.
If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be
optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking
sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that
leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking
institutions. (JEL G01, G21, G28)
The U.S. banking system now features two components of equal importance,
traditional banks and the so-called “shadow banking system.” This term refers
to the nexus of financial institutions that perform the function of traditional
banks by financing loans with the issuance of money-like liabilities while not
being subject to the prudential regulation of banks. Pozsar et al. (2010) offer
an excellent detailed description of the shadow banking system, and show that
its total liabilities have the same order of magnitude as that of the traditional
banking sector.
Most observers agree that the growth of shadow banking has been largely
driven by regulatory arbitrage (see, e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2013;
Gorton and Metrick 2010; Pozsar et al. 2010). Traditional banks are subject
to regulatory capital requirements that put an upper bound on their leverage.
The shadow banking system enabled the refinancing of bank assets with near-
monies, such as money market funds shares with a higher leverage than that
imposed on traditional banks. As a result, the growth of the shadow banking
system has greatly increased the effective leverage on loans to the U.S. economy
and, in particular, the amount of money-like liabilities backed by these loans.
In the face of the costs that the 2008 banking crisis has created for the world
economy, a global trend towards imposing heightened capital requirements on
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traditional banks has emerged. On the other hand, regulatory reforms remain
thus far largely silent on many aspects of shadow banking (Adrian and Ashcraft
2012; Gorton and Metrick 2010). As noted by several observers (e.g., Adrian
and Ashcraft 2012; Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson 2010; Stein 2010), this raises
the possibility that heightened capital requirements for traditional banks trigger
even more regulatory arbitrage than was observed in the recent past, thereby
inducing a large migration of banking activities towards a more lightly regulated
shadow banking system.1 The higher solvency of the traditional banking system
then may be more than offset by such growth in shadow banking. This may
ultimately lead to a higher aggregate exposure of the money-like liabilities of
the formal and shadow banking sectors (deposits, money market funds shares,
and repurchase agreements) to shocks on loans.
Implicit in this view is the assumption that a rapid pace of financial, legal,
and accounting innovations enables financial institutions to create and exploit
regulatory arbitrage opportunities, thereby relaxing the economic constraints
that prudential rules aim to subject them too. The goal of this paper is to develop
a framework to study optimal bank capital regulation in the presence of such
regulatory arbitrage.
It has been a long-standing idea that the rise of new forms of financial
contracts is often triggered by regulatory constraints (see, e.g., Silber 1983;
Miller 1986; Kane 1988). The arbitrage of capital requirements has become in
particular an important feature of the banking industry since the implementation
of the first Basel accords.2 Yet, formal models of optimal bank capital regulation
with such imperfect enforcement are lacking. Given the current regulatory
agenda, it seems important to develop frameworks for the analysis of prudential
regulation in which the possibility of regulatory arbitrage is taken seriously.
This paper studies the optimal prudential regulation of banks in the presence
of a shadow banking sector.
The paper proceeds in two steps. It first presents a baseline model of optimal
bank capital regulation with perfect enforcement. It then studies a modification
of this model in which banks can bypass prudential regulation using the shadow
banking sector.
In the baseline model, banks issue liabilities backed by their loan portfolios
to nonfinancial agents. Banks use the proceeds to fund their portfolios, and
to pay dividends to their shareholders, who in turn invest them in profitable
investments outside the banking industry. Nonfinancial agents use their claims
to banks to settle mutually beneficial transactions. Crucially, the risk on bank
1
“The dilemma of the current regulatory reform efforts is that the motivation for shadow banking has likely become
even stronger as the gap between capital and liquidity requirements on traditional institutions and non-regulated
institutions has increased.” (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012) “(. . .) the danger is that, in the face of higher capital
requirements, these same forces of competition are likely to drive a greater volume of traditional banking activity
into the so-called ‘shadow banking’ sector.” (Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson 2010)
2 Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) survey the evidence.
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liabilities undermines this role as a medium of exchange, and destroys gains
from trade among nonfinancial agents. A given bank does not fully internalize
this cost when issuing liabilities because surplus from trade is split between
its customers and their trading partners. As a result, the privately optimal bank
leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. There is room for a prudential
regulation that caps the risk-adjusted leverage of banks, and that is binding
in equilibrium. An important feature of this regulation is that banks commit
to a leverage ratio that is not contingent on the private information that they
may receive about their lending opportunities. This reduces adverse selection
and maximizes the cash that they raise per dollar of liabilities issued. This
corresponds to the fact that banks typically back their deposits with a large
pool of very diverse asset classes in a single balance sheet.
I then introduce shadow banking as follows. I assume that bankers can bypass
capital requirements because the regulator cannot observe their transactions
with money market funds (MMFs) that also issue money-like liabilities to
nonfinancial agents. Banks can use the shadow banking sector to pledge a
larger fraction of their portfolios than prudential regulation permits in principle.
Crucially, banks and MMFs interact in a spot market in which banks cannot
commit to not use their private information. Thus, they face adverse selection
costs: their portfolios are less liquid in the shadow banking sector than in the
formal one. The upside from this adverse selection is that it induces banks to
raise less cash in the shadow banking sector than they would absent this friction.
The downside is that they issue larger liabilities and thus transfer more risk per
dollar raised.
There are two locally optimal regulatory responses to such regulatory
arbitrage. First, the regulator can tighten capital requirements, triggering an
increase in shadow banking activity and making banks that are not willing to
incur adverse selection costs very safe. Second, the regulator may also prefer
to relax regulatory capital requirements so as to bring shadow banking activity
back in the spotlight of regulation. Current regulatory reforms seem to trend
towards the former solution. The latter one may yet be preferable, particularly
so if informational frictions in the shadow banking sector are not important.
Although the paper focuses on the impact of tighter capital requirements
on shadow banking activity, the model has implications beyond this specific
question. It makes the more general point that regulating the riskiness of the
liabilities issued by financial institutions may be counterproductive when the
regulator cannot measure risk as accurately as can the other agents. A tighter
regulation then results in financial institutions tending to transfer riskier claims
to their creditors, and this endogenous response may more than offset the direct
impact of regulation.
This paper relates to two strands of literature. First, it offers a simple (yet fully
microfounded) model for the role of bank deposits as media of exchange and the
resulting externalities from bank insolvencies. Whereas the traditional banking
literature has mostly emphasized the role of banks in maturity transformation,
[11:46 8/12/2014 RFS-hhu055.tex] Page: 149 146–175
the key benefit of banks in this paper is that they provide nonfinancial agents
with claims that they can use to settle trades. The rationale for prudential
regulation is then that banks do not capture the full surplus from trade, and
hence do not internalize the full social cost of bank failure. Gu et al. (2013)
explain this role of bank liabilities as near monies with the superior commitment
power of banks. I take this role for granted, and study its implications in terms
of socially and privately optimal bank balance sheets. Kahn and Santos (2010)
also assume such a role for bank liabilities in facilitating trade, and show that
banks may fail to fully internalize the social costs of their exposures to each
other’s risk in the interbank market in this case.
This paper also relates to the literature on the interaction between banks and
markets. Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011) study the ex ante impact on
banks of ex post adverse selection in the secondary market for their assets. In
their setup, the fear of future adverse selection may induce banks to offload their
risky assets too early so as to sell them at fair value. This is inefficient because
this implies that the suppliers of liquidity to banks hoard less cash to snap up
these assets given a lower expected return on them. This in turn reduces the total
quantity of valuable risky assets in which banks decide to invest in the first place.
By contrast, I emphasize that adverse selection in secondary markets for bank
assets may be ex ante desirable as it reduces the scope for regulatory arbitrage.
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) develop a model of shadow banking in
which banks pool their idiosyncratic risks, thereby increasing their systematic
exposure, and use the safe part of these recombined portfolios to back the
issuance of safe debt. Although this is efficient under rational expectations,
shadow banking creates large financial instability and systemic risk when agents
underestimate the tail of systematic risk.
Ordonez (2013) develops an interesting model of shadow banking in which
unregulated banking can be superior to regulated banking if (1) regulation
inefficiently restricts risk taking by banks and (2) reputational concerns are
an effective disciplining device in the shadow banking sector. This relates to
the broad point also made here that if regulation is inefficient, then a shadow
banking sector might be desirable, although the rationale is quite different.
Finally, Harris, Opp, and Opp (2014) develop a model in which capital
requirements for banks may be counterproductive like in this paper, but for
a very different reason. In their model, capital requirements reduce the funding
capacity of banks. This spurs entry by nonbanks in the business of lending to
good borrowers. This induces banks to focus on lending to bad borrowers for
which their profits are generated by the government put, rather than by the
intrinsic value of the projects that they fund.
1. Unregulated Banking
There are two dates: t =1,2. There are four agents: a household, an entrepreneur,
the shareholder of a bank, and the manager of a money market fund, who is
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simply referred to as the “MMF” henceforth. All agents are risk neutral over
consumption at dates 1 and 2, and cannot consume negatively. They do not
discount future consumption. There is a consumption good that is valued by all
agents and used as the numéraire.
The household receives a date-1 endowment of W units of the numéraire
good, where W >0.
The entrepreneur has access to a technology that enables him to produce a
second consumption good. Only the household derives utility from consuming
this second good. Production takes place at date 2. However, the entrepreneur
must decide at date 1 on a production scaleN1 - a number of units to be produced
at date 2. He can revise this production scale at date 2 from N1 to N2 before
producing, but this comes at an adjustment cost
k
2
(N2−N1)2 ,
where k>0. Once the scale is fixed, the production of each unit of output comes
at a disutility c to the entrepreneur, where c∈ (0,1). The household values one
unit of output as much as one of the numéraire good.
The entrepreneur cannot commit to not withdraw his human capital at date
2. He can always walk away at no cost, thereby not producing any output. He
can use this threat to renegotiate any arrangement, and has all the bargaining
power during such renegotiations.
Because c<1, there are potential gains from trade between the household
and the entrepreneur, but they cannot reap them because of this commitment
problem. The entrepreneur would never make good on a promise to deliver
output at date 2 against a date-1 payment by the household. The initial household
endowment W therefore must be stored from date 0 to date 1, so that the
household and the entrepreneur can trade numéraire for the entrepreneur’s
output at date 1. Both the bank and the MMF supply such stores of value to the
household.
The manager of the money market fund is penniless. He is endowed with a
storage technology that is linear with unit return.
The bank shareholder is penniless, and has access to two investment
opportunities. First, he can originate a loan portfolio, which is simply modeled
as an investment opportunity that requires an initial outlay I >0 at date 1 against
a repayment at date 2. If the portfolio is of high quality (“good”), it repays L+ l,
while it repays L if of low quality (“bad”), where
0<L<L+ l.
The quality of the portfolio is not observable. All agents share the common
prior belief that the portfolio is of high quality with probability p∈ (0,1). The
outlay I must be funded using the household’s resources, and the bank can
pledge all or part of the portfolio’s expected payoff to the household.
Second, the shareholder of the bank also has access to an alternative
investment opportunity at date 1. If he invests x units in this opportunity,
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this generates a gross return x+f (x) with probability q, and x only with
probability 1−q. The function f satisfies the Inada conditions. I assume that
this gross return cannot be pledged to the other agents, so that any investment in
this alternative technology must be entirely financed by the bank shareholder.
Following Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011), nonpledgeability could
stem, for example, from the fact that this is a long-term investment that pays
off only at some remote date 3, at which only the bank shareholder values
consumption.3 This alternative opportunity stands for, for example, equity
investments outside the banking industry. The quality of the loan portfolio
and the return on the alternative investment are independent random variables.
The exact timing of the interaction between these agents is the following:
• at date 1, the household stores its resources with the bank and the MMF.
The bank issues a security backed by the portfolio and the household bids
competitively for it. The entrepreneur makes an initial capacity choice,
and
• at date 2, the household receives the proceeds from storage. The
entrepreneur, observing this, makes a capacity-adjustment choice and
makes a take-it-or-leave-it trading offer to the household.
The analysis focuses on the subgame perfect equilibria of this economy.
Finally, the following parameter restrictions simplify the analysis:
pl+L−I > k
2
p(1−p)l2 (1)
kl < min{c;1−c}, (2)
qf ′ (pl+L−I ) < k(1−p)l. (3)
Their respective roles will be explained in due course.
1.1 Equilibrium
I solve backwards for the equilibria in this economy. Consider first date
2. Suppose that the household has an endowment W2 at date 2 and that
the entrepreneur has chosen a capacity N1 at date 1. The following lemma
characterizes their date-2 interaction.
Lemma 1. The entrepreneur always sets a maximal output price of one per
unit and adjusts his capacity from N1 to N2 =W2. His profit is therefore
(1−c)W2− k(W2−N1)
2
2
3 This assumption could be weakened: I could allow for partial pledgeability of the cash flows generated by this
investment opportunity, only at the cost of adding some complexity.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Given his commitment problem, the entrepreneur behaves as a monopolist
that maximizes his ex post profits after uncertainty resolves at date 2. Condition
(2) implies sufficiently low capacity-adjustment costs so that the entrepreneur
finds it optimal to charge the household his willingness to pay of one per unit,
and to adjust capacity so as to match the household’s resources at this price. This
ex post interaction implies that the entrepreneur chooses his initial capacity N1
as follows.
Lemma 2. If the entrepreneur believes that the date-2 resources of the
household are a random variable W˜2, he chooses an initial capacity
N1 =E
(
W˜2
)
,
and has an expected utility
UE =(1−c)E
(
W˜2
)− k
2
V ar
(
W˜2
)
. (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Adjustment costs imply that the entrepreneur would like to eliminate
uncertainty on date-2 demand. If the entrepreneur could commit to a contract,
this could be achieved by efficient contracting. The entrepreneur and the
household could enter into a private deposit-insurance scheme that saves
adjustment costs. The household could agree to pay more than one for the
output when its date-2 income is large, against the promise that the entrepreneur
charges a price smaller than one for the same quantity when its income is
low. The entrepreneur’s inability to commit implies that he maximizes ex
post profits, which precludes such private insurance mechanisms. Thus, this
contracting friction implies that the riskiness of the storages offered by the
financial system to nonfinancial agents has a real impact. The assumption of
symmetric quadratic adjustment costs is only for tractability because it implies
that variance is the relevant risk measure. One could introduce more realistic,
but less tractable, costs that arise only in case of large downsizings.
Consider now the date-1 interaction between the household and the suppliers
of stores of value, i.e., the MMF and the bank. From Lemma 1, if the household
has resources W2 at date 2, the entrepreneur keeps him at his date-2 reservation
utility W2. The household is therefore willing to store any amount between
dates 1 and 2 rather than consume it at date 1, as long as the expected gross rate
of return is larger than one. Because the MMF can offer a return on storage of
at most one to the household, he has no choice but to offer exactly one. This
implies that the household prices the securities issued by the bank so that it
earns a unit expected return.
The equilibrium is thus entirely chacterized by the portfolio-backed security
that the bank designs and pledges to the household. Such a security is in turn
characterized by its payoff when the portfolio is good and that when it is bad.
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A generic security is fully described with two numbers λ,μ∈ [0,1], such that
the household receives μL if the portfolio turns out to be bad and μL+λl when
it is good, against a date-1 cash payment of μL+λpl. It must be that
μL+λpl≥I ;
otherwise, the bank cannot fund its loan portfolio. The net cash μL+λpl−I
is paid out as a dividend to the bank shareholders, who reinvest it in their
redeployment opportunity outside the bank. The household stores its residual
wealth W −μL−λpL with the MMF.4 For such a contract (λ,μ), the date-1
endowment of the household is distributed as{
W +(1−p)λl with prob. p
W −pλl with prob. 1−p .
From Lemma 2, the expected utility of the entrepreneur for such a contract is
therefore
UE =W (1−c)− k2p(1−p)λ
2l2, (5)
whereas that of the bank shareholder is:
UB = μL+λpl+(1−μ)L+p(1−λ)l−I +qf (μL+λpL−I )
= pl+L−I +qf (μL+λpl−I ). (6)
The bank shareholder receives μL+λpl from the household at date 1, and
expects a payoff of (1−μ)L+p(1−λ)l on his residual stake.
It is transparent from (6) that the bank utility increases w.r.t.λ andμ.The bank
values cash at date 1 more than at date 2 because of its date-1 nonpledgeable
investment, and thus prefers to issue the largest possible security against the
portfolio. Absent any regulatory constraint, it always chooses μ=λ=1, thereby
creating the largest possible adjustment costs for the entrepreneur. Of course,
only the risky part of the portfolio payoff creates negative externalities for the
entrepreneur. Accordingly, his utility does not depend on μ.
Lemma 3. The unregulated bank chooses to pledge its entire portfolio: μ=
λ=1.
Proof. See discussion above.
This way, the model captures in an elementary fashion the idea that banks’
optimal private leverage is excessive because banks do not internalize all
the costs induced by the riskiness of their liabilities. This is in turn because
these liabilities are near-monies. They serve to facilitate transactions between
a bank’s customer and another agent (the entrepreneur) who is not a customer
4 I assume that W is sufficiently large that this term is always positive.
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of this bank. Thus, the bank does not fully internalize any reduction in surplus
from such transactions due to the riskiness of its liabilities.
The model of leverage externalities presented here is kept very simple
because it is only one of the ingredients of the analysis. Yet, it is based on
first principles, and could be extended along several dimensions in future work
and for other applications. In particular, there are several ways to ensure that
the bank shareholder partially internalizes the costs to the real economy caused
by the riskiness of his liabilities, so that his capital-structure problem has an
interior solution.
Suppose, for example, that the household extracts a fraction of the surplus
from trade with the entrepreneur (e.g., the household can make an offer to
the entrepreneur with some probability) and that the MMF is competitive.
In this case, the bank would face a convex cost of debt, because it would
have to compensate the household for making a risky deposit—thus raising
expected adjustment costs and in turn lowering expected surplus—rather than
investing in the MMF. More generally, one could write a more symmetric
model in which nonfinancial agents make deposits first, then search for trading
partners and incur real costs if the value of their deposits is uncertain when
they withdraw them to execute trades with a partner. Clearly, there would still
be leverage externalities as long as all the agents do not make deposits at the
same monopolistic bank. Each bank would not internalize the entire fraction
of the surplus that its leverage decision destroys.
2. The Prudential Regulation of Banks
Suppose now that there is an initial date t =0 at which a regulator grants a
banking license to the shareholder of the bank.Abanking license is the exclusive
right to originate the loan portfolio described above at date 1. The regulator is
entitled to regulate as he sees fit the design of the securities that the bank issues
at date 1. He perfectly observes the securities that the bank sells to the household
and possibly to the MMF at date 1, so that the bank and the household cannot
bypass regulation through the MMF. The goal of the regulator is to maximize
the utilitarian welfare of the other agents as expected from date 0. At date 0, the
regulator announces the security design that the shareholder of the bank must
comply with if he were to accept the license. Both parties can fully commit to
this design.
Condition (1) implies that the regulator finds it optimal to grant a banking
license: this inequality states that the surplus from originating the loan, even
excluding possible gains from investments in the alternative opportunity, is
larger than the maximal adjustment costs for the entrepreneur. The security
design that the regulator can impose on the bank shareholder at date 0 is again
characterized by two numbers λ, μ∈ [0,1] such that the bank pledges μL to
the household if the portfolio is bad and μL+λl if it is good. It must be that
μL+λpl≥I ;
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otherwise, the bank cannot fund the loan portfolio. For such a security,
expression (5) and (6) imply that utilitarian welfare is5
L+pl−I +qf (μL+λpl−I )
+W (1−c)− k
2
p(1−p)λ2l2. (7)
Maximizing it is a simple convex problem that yields:
Proposition 1. The optimal security (λ∗,μ∗) is such thatμ∗ =1, andλ∗ ∈ (0,1)
is the unique solution to
qf ′ (λ∗pl+L−I )=λ∗k(1−p)l. (8)
It admits a simple implementation, whereby the regulator imposes only a capital
requirement on the bank. The regulator imposes that the bank retains a minimum
equity stake in the portfolio and issues (risky) debt. The fraction of the portfolio
payoff that backs debt cannot exceed
λ∗pl+L
pl+L
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fraction λ∗ is the central endogenous parameter of the model. It admits
a natural interpretation as the net bank leverage or the risk-adjusted bank
leverage. After the household has paid an amount λ∗pl+L, which is used to
fund the portfolio, and to pay a dividend λ∗pl+L−I to the shareholder, the
bank has the balance sheet depicted in Figure 1.
The asset side features the portfolio. The liability side is comprised of two
claims, with that of the household having absolute seniority over that of the
bank shareholder (hence the term “shareholder” that anticipated the optimal
design). The household’s liability has a perfectly safe tranche L backed by a
deterministic cash flow, and a riskier tranche that pays off only if the portfolio is
of high quality. In other words, debt net of cash-like assets represents a fraction
λ∗ of the risky part of the assets. In this sense, λ∗ is the net leverage. Such
a risk-adjusted leverage is typically the variable on which current prudential
regulations set an upper bound.
It is transparent from (8) that the regulatory net leverage λ∗ is larger when the
opportunity cost of bank capital is high (q large), and the negative externalities
that the bank imposes on the real economy are small (k small). It is also easy to
see that an increase in p holding pl fixed leads to a higher regulatory leverage.
That is, capital requirements should be risk based, and should put more weight
on assets with a riskier cash-flow distribution (in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance).
5 Clearly, the MMF and the household are always kept at their reservation utility and thus can be ignored.
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pl
L
Household 
deposit
Equity
Figure 1
Bank balance sheet after initial cash transfers are made
This model thus captures parsimoniously the broad terms of the debate
on bank capital requirements. On one hand, heightened capital requirements
reduce the negative externalities that bank failures impose on the rest of the
economy by undermining the role of bank claims as reliable stores of value.
On the other hand, allocating more bank equity to the financing of loans comes
at a cost if there is no perfect substitute to this equity capital for the financing
of alternative valuable projects.
This stripped-down model can be extended in several directions. The
Online Appendix offers an extension in which the payoff of the loan portfolio
is continuous. I show that it is still the case that standard debt, that is, a senior
tranche on the portfolio payoff, is the optimal design for the household’s claim.
The Online Appendix also discusses the interplay of capital requirements and
(imperfect) deposit insurance in this framework. Another important extension
that I leave for future research consists of taking into account the general
equilibrium effects of bank regulation. One possible effect could stem, for
example, from a feedback loop between the risk borne by entrepreneurs and
the riskiness of loan portfolios in a closed model in which banks lend to
entrepreneurs.
3. Prudential Regulation with Information Problematic Assets
I now add informational frictions to this model of bank regulation. Suppose
that the bank shareholder acquires two pieces of private information at date
1. He privately observes the quality of the loan portfolio, and whether or not
the alternative investment generates the excess return f . Thus, there are four
bank “types” at date 1: the bank may have access to a good or a bad portfolio,
and may or may not have a valuable alternative investment. The rest of the
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model is unchanged. In particular, all agents share the date-0 prior belief that
the portfolio is good with probability p, and that the alternative investment is
valuable with probability q.
The assumption that the bank privately observes the quality of the loan
portfolio simply captures the longstanding view in banking economics that
banks have a superior ability to acquire soft information for screening potential
borrowers. The assumption that the bank shareholder privately observes the
characteristics of his alternative option is a convenient way to parametrize the
magnitude of the adverse-selection problem caused by his inside information
about the portfolio. The optimal security is the same as that absent private
information:
Proposition 2. The optimal security does not depend on the date-1 type of
the bank. It is identical to that described in Proposition 1: the bank commits to
pledge the safe part of the portfolio payoff and a fraction λ∗ of its risky part
that solves (8).
Proof. See the Appendix.
There is pooling across date-1 bank types. Regardless of its date-1 private
information, the bank again issues risky debt against its portfolio, and retains
a level of equity that depends only on the initial public information available
about the portfolio. The only difference with the symmetric information case
is that the leverage λ∗ is no longer an upper bound, but rather a target that the
bank must reach at date 1. Unlike in the symmetric-information case, long-
term contracting is important because such pooling is not ex post optimal for
the bank. If it was making an ex post optimal financing decision, a bank that
has a good portfolio and no valuable alternative investment would not raise
more than I from the household at date 1. Pooling is ex ante optimal, however.
The intuition for this is simple. The goal of the regulator is that a bank with
a valuable alternative opportunity raises as much cash as possible at date 1
for a given level of risk transferred to the household. Given that a bank with
a bad portfolio always seeks to mimic the type that raises as much cash as
possible at date 1, the regulator achieves this by asking that a bank with a good
portfolio and no valuable alternative opportunity pools with a bank that has a
good portfolio and an opportunity. This minimizes the cost of date-1 adverse
selection for this latter bank type, and this does not come at any ex ante cost to
the bank because it is just a subsidy from one of its future types to the others.
Again, this optimal mechanism admits a very simple and realistic
implementation. The regulator only needs to impose an upper bound on the risk
of bank’s liabilities viewed from date 0, measured as the variance transferred
to the household. Actual prudential regulations typically involve value-at-risk
computations that aim at a similar goal. Then, subject to this risk-transfer
constraint, the bank finds it privately optimal to commit to a pooling behavior
whereby it aims at the same leverage regardless of its realized type. The reason
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is again that this maximizes the amount of cash raised at date 1 subject to the
risk-transfer constraint. Banks achieve such pooling in practice by warehousing
very diverse classes of loans in a single balance sheet that also receives their
deposits, instead of creating many licensed subsidiaries with many different
capital levels.6 This pooling is in sharp contrast with the way banks refinance
assets in securitization markets, or more generally transfer risks in the shadow
banking sector. They typically have a greater discretion at picking the assets
that they pledge in such markets, at least at the asset-class level. I now introduce
such alternative refinancings in the model.
4. Shadow Banking
This section introduces shadow banking in the model of the previous section,
and studies how this affects prudential regulation. The following subsection
first describes the innovations and prudential and accounting loopholes that
enabled the precrisis growth and transformation of the shadow banking sector.
4.1 Shadow banking as unlicensed banking7
As already mentioned, the rise of the shadow banking sector has been largely
motivated by regulatory arbitrage. Shadow banking aimed at recreating outside
the regulatory umbrella the basics of banking: backing near-monies with risky
long-term loans. In the shadow banking sector, money market funds shares
played the role of deposits, while asset-backed securities (ABS) held by asset
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits played that of long-term assets.
MMFs shares are perceived as quasi-deposits because MMFs are allowed to
subscribe and redeem their shares at a fixed net asset value (typically set to $1).
MMFs are allowed to do so in turn because they are managed in accordance with
Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which puts restrictions
on the maturity, quality, and dispersion of their investments. Although MMFs
have traditionally invested in assets that were ultimately backed by very safe
short-term claims such as receivables, their exposure to riskier bank loans
increased dramatically between 1990 and the outburst of the crisis. This was
driven by a sharp increase in the share of ABCP in their investments (from
5.7% to 57% between 1990 and 2007), and by a large shift of ABCP conduits
from short-term investments to investments in ABS backed by loans.
This evolution of MMFs’ assets begs two questions. First, why did MMF
shares continue to be perceived as very safe despite such massive asset
substitution? The reason is that the banks sponsoring the ABCP conduits were
granting guarantees to their conduits, mostly explicitly but also implicitly for
6 Leland and Pyle (1977) or Diamond (1984) offer alternative, yet related, rationales for such pooling by banks.
7 This subsection summarizes, and therefore borrows without restraints from, detailed accounts by Acharya,
Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
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reputational reasons. Second, why did the sponsoring banks find it economical
to refinance loans with such guaranteed ABCP conduits? The answer is that
the capital requirements for such guarantees were much lower than those that
would have prevailed, had the sponsoring banks held the assets in their balance
sheet instead of transferring them to conduits that they then guaranteed.
This difference in prudential treatments of economically similar situations
followed from two main accounting and prudential loopholes. First, the
guarantees granted by sponsors to conduits were nominally liquidity guarantees
rather than credit guarantees. Sponsoring banks were supposed to buy back
loans at face value upon the conduit’s request only in the event that no credit
losses had occured, where credit losses were formally defined as significant
changes in variables such as delinquency rates. This justified low capital
charges. In practice, however, it becomes evident that a portfolio is not
performing long before credit losses defined this way materialize. Hence, these
liquidity guarantees acted in fact as credit risk transfers from the conduit to the
sponsor. Second, in 2004, the U.S. regulator permanently exempted banks from
consolidating such liquidity-supported conduits. This way, banks were origi-
nating and bearing credit risk without incurring the related capital requirements.
Beyond the specifics of the 2008 crisis, regulatory arbitrage by banks
typically amounts more broadly to finding alternative legal and accounting
classifications for transactions that would be privately uneconomical given reg-
ulation under the standard classification, so that they can be carried out outside
the scope of regulation. For example, having MMFs with a fixed net asset value
investing in ABCP backed by ABS is economically close to commercial bank-
ing, but legally, and therefore prudentially, quite different. In practice, these
regulatory arbitrages exploit fine details and subtle loopholes in accounting
rules and prudential regulations. These details vary over time, but the principle
remains. I now introduce this view of regulatory arbitrage in the model.
4.2 Shadow banking and bank capital
In line with the above discussion, I introduce shadow banking in the model
of Section 3 as follows. I now suppose that while the regulator observes the
date-1 trade between the bank and the household, the bank and the MMF can
trade secretly at date 1. The rest of the model is unchanged. Thus, while the
bank and the regulator can agree at date 0 on a direct risk transfer from the
bank to the household and commit to it, the regulator cannot prevent the bank
from offloading more risk on the household indirectly through the MMF, who
can invest the funds that he collects from the household with the bank instead
of using his linear technology. I deem this unregulated interaction the shadow
banking sector.
The sale of a stake in the portfolio to the MMF outside the regulatory
umbrella may be interpreted as transferring this stake to an off-balance sheet
vehicle that is ultimately refinanced by money market funds. This is in line
with the evolution already detailed, whereby money market funds shifted
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investments from standard commercial paper backed by short-term claims to
assets backed by bank loans. In practice, risk was not directly transferred to
MMF shareholders as I model it. Explicit or implicit bank guarantees implied
that this risk was ultimately borne by banks, even though accounting and
prudential rules did not reflect this. I abstract from this extra layer of institutional
details here: it is immaterial in my model whether the household gets direct
exposure to the risk of the portfolio through his holding of MMF shares, or
indirectly through the risk that the bank guarantee creates for its deposits. All
that matters is the possibility for the bank to pledge stakes in its loan portfolio
outside the regulator’s supervision.
The key ingredient of the model is that the bank trades ex post optimally with
the MMF in a spot-market interaction at date 1. This inability to trade in an ex
ante optimal fashion is the only distinction between formal and shadow banking.
I view this as a parsimonious and natural way to distinguish between the
arm’s length interactions in the opaque over-the-counter markets of the shadow
banking sector and the long-term, more open-book, relationship between banks
and their supervisors.
I now solve for the optimal security chosen by the regulator in the presence
of this additional friction. Clearly, the additional friction of secret trading
between the bank and the MMF leaves two aspects of the optimal security
in Proposition 2 unchanged. First, it is still optimal that the bank sells the entire
risk-free cash flow L to the household. It is in fact immaterial whether the sale
of this risk-free cash flow takes place under the regulatory umbrella or in the
shadow banking sector. Second, it is still optimal that, as in Proposition 2, the
regulator asks all date-1 bank types to pool and sell the same fraction λ of
the risky cash flow l. This maximizes the cash raised by the bank under the
regulatory umbrella for a given level of risk transfer.
Determining the optimal contract enforced by the regulator thus merely
consists in solving for this optimal regulatory leverage λ in the presence
of shadow banking. I now solve for such an optimal regulatory leverage in
two steps. I first fix an arbitrary regulatory leverage λ, and characterize the
resulting activity in the shadow banking sector. In a second step, I determine
the optimal regulatory leverage when the regulator rationally anticipates such
shadow banking activity induced by capital regulation.
4.2.1 Shadow banking activity for a given regulatory leverage. Suppose
that the net regulatory leverage is λ∈ (0,1). The bank may then sell all or part
of the risky cash flow (1−λ)l to the household via the MMF in the shadow
banking sector. Trading between the bank and the MMF in the shadow banking
sector takes place as follows. To avoid trivial zero-trade equilibria and have a
unique equilibrium,8 I suppose that the uninformed party, the MMF, offers a
8 Equilibrium uniqueness is important because it pins down the beliefs of the regulator about shadow banking
activity when he makes a date-0 decision on λ.
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linear price r at which he is willing to buy stakes in the portfolio. The MMF is
competitive: he quotes the highest possible price subject to breaking even (so
that the household accepts financing him).
A bank with a good portfolio and no valuable opportunity turns down any
price lower than one, and would be mimicked by a bad bank at this price.
Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium in which a good bank with no
opportunity trades. The MMF thus quotes the price
r =
pq
1−p+pq ,
which is the probability that the bank is good and has a valuable opportunity
conditionally on the bank trading. Such a good bank chooses to sell a stake λ′
that maximizes its utility subject to being mimicked by a bad bank. Formally,
it solves
max
λ′∈[0,1−λ]
(
pλ+rλ′
)
l+L−I +f ((pλ+rλ′)l+L−I)+(1−λ−λ′)l. (9)
To characterize the equilibrium in the shadow banking sector, it is convenient
to introduce the function ϕ defined as
ϕ =f ′−1,
a decreasing bijection from (0,+∞) into (0,+∞). Ignoring the constraint that
λ′ ∈ [0,1−λ], the first-order condition for program (9) reads:(
pλ+rλ′
)
l =ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L. (10)
The interaction between the bank and the MMF in the shadow banking sector
resembles the stage game of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), where an uninformed
competitive market maker (the MMF here) faces either an informed trader (the
bad bank) or a liquidity trader (the good bank with a valuable opportunity).
The only difference is that traded quantities are endogenous. Equation (10)
formalizes the idea that tighter regulatory constraints (a smaller λ) spurs more
shadow banking activity (a larger λ′). Let
λ=
ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L
pl
, λ̂=
ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L−rl
(p−r)l .
Lemma 4. If λ≥λ, then the shadow banking sector is inactive (λ′ =0). If
λ≤ λ̂, then the bank sells its entire residual stake (1−λ)l to the MMF.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In words, the informational problems in the unregulated shadow banking
sector are ex ante desirable in the sense that they make trading more costly
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to the bank. The threshold λ is particularly low when the bank is not very
constrained (q small) and the expected quality of its portfolio is low (p small).
Notice that the model predicts that regulatory arbitrage and shadow banking
activity may arise even if bank capital regulation and the opportunity cost of
bank equity remain constant. All that is needed is the perception of portfolio
quality improvements, that is, that p increases holding pl constant. Optimistic
views on the real estate market have triggered such changes in the assessment
of the risk to mortgages in the years preceding the crisis.
For brevity, the remainder of the paper restricts the analysis to the most
interesting case in which
λ<1. (11)
To make this parameter restriction compatible with the previous ones, I
introduce an extra parameter by assuming that the entrepreneur internalizes
only a fraction αk of the total adjustments costs k that he generates, so that (2)
becomes
αkl≤min{c;1−c}.
A straightforward microfoundation is that the entrepreneur purchases inputs
from risk-averse suppliers or workers without commitment, thereby creating
ex ante disutility costs for them when adjusting scale ex post. The regulator
takes these agents into account when maximizing total surplus. It is easy to see
that (11) implies (is, in fact, equivalent to):
λ>λ̂.
Lemma 5. Suppose that λ1, λ2 ∈ [0,1] satisfy
λ̂≤λ1 <λ2 ≤λ.
A regulatory leverage λ2 strictly Pareto dominates a regulatory leverage λ1.
The utility of the bank is the same under both leverages whereas adjustment
costs are strictly higher under λ2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This formalizes the broad idea that tightening capital requirements may be
counterproductive in the presence of the shadow banking sector. Here, tighter
capital requirements are highly counterproductive in the sense that they are
Pareto dominated. As a result, the optimal regulatory leverage, if it is interior
(different from 0 or 1), cannot be strictly between λ̂ and λ.
The intuition is simple. Condition (10) states that the date-1 resources of
a bank with a valuable alternative investment do not depend on λ as λ varies
within
[̂
λ,λ
]
.The bank undoes any regulatory restriction in the shadow banking
sector. In response to a reduction −dλ in regulatory leverage, however, shadow
leverage increases by
dλ′ =
p
r
dλ>dλ.
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That is, the lemons premium in the shadow sector leads the bank to transfer
more risk per dollar raised in the shadow sector than with regulated deposits.
Lemmas 4 and 5 suggest conflicting effects of adverse selection in the shadow
sector. On one hand, Lemma 4 implies that adverse selection curbs shadow
banking by reducing the amount of cash that the bank seeks to raise in this
sector. On the other hand, Lemma 5 shows that adverse selection increases the
quantity of risk transfer per dollar raised. Here, I study these two effects for
an arbitrary regulatory leverage λ. The relevant impact of adverse selection,
however, is that for an optimal leverage chosen ex ante by the regulator, which
I solve for now.
Before doing so, it is worthwhile to make the following technical remark. The
assumption that the MMF offers linear contracts is without loss of generality.
If the MMF was competing with general contracts, separation could not be an
equilibrium outcome. This is because in a separating equilibrium, a bad bank
would always take the contract that generates the highest date-1 payment. Thus,
the good bank would take the contract with a lower payment, and would get
less than the pooling price for its stake so that the MMF breaks even over all
types. Deviating with a pooling contract attracts the good bank, and pooling is
therefore the only sustainable competitive outcome if any. As is well known,
the existence of an equilibrium in such competitive screening games depends
on the exact equilibrium concept.
4.2.2 Optimal regulatory leverage in the presence of shadow banking.
Proposition 3. a. If
kplλ≤1, (12)
then the shadow banking sector is inactive (λ′ =0), and the optimal capital
requirement is λ∗ as in Proposition 2: imperfect enforcement does not affect
the equilibrium.
b. If
kpl̂λ≤1<kplλ, (13)
then the shadow banking sector is inactive (λ′ =0), and the optimal capital
requirement is λ>λ∗. Imperfect enforcement makes the bank better off but
reduces utilitarian welfare.
c. If
kpl̂λ>1, (14)
there are two local maxima for total surplus, λ>λ∗ and λ<λ̂,λ∗. The shadow
banking sector is inactive at the highest leverage λ, is fully active (λ′ =1−λ) at
the lowestλ. In both cases, the bank is better off than under perfect enforcement,
and total surplus is lower. Either local maximum can be global, depending on
parameter values.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The various regimes in Proposition 3 are spanned by, for example, letting
the adjustment cost parameter k vary, holding other parameters fixed. In
case a, k is sufficiently small, ceteris paribus, so that the optimal regulatory
leverage under perfect enforcement λ∗ is large. The bank is not sufficiently
constrained by regulation so that it feels the need to incur the trading costs
associated with an opaque shadow sector. Shadow banking is irrelevant in this
case.
In case b with a larger k, it is no longer so. Shadow banking is a relevant threat.
The regulator does not handle this threat with tighter capital requirements.
On the contrary, he relaxes the capital requirement (λ>λ∗) up to the point
at which the bank will not find any further refinancing in the shadow sector
worthwhile. In other words, the regulator does himself at date 0 what the bank
would do anyway at date 1—increase its effective leverage—in a socially more
efficient fashion given that shadow banking transfers more risk to the household
per dollar raised. As a result, there is no equilibrium shadow banking activity
(λ′ =0). Yet the threat of shadow banking is effective as the bank is strictly better
off with a higher feasible leverage λ than in the baseline model with perfect
enforcement. Total surplus would be higher absent shadow banking under the
smaller leverage λ∗.
Finally, in case c in which k is the largest, there are two locally optimal
capital requirements. First, the regulatory leverage λ that is optimal in case b is
still locally optimal, and may or may not be the global optimum. Second, there
exists another local optimum λ<λ∗, whereby the strategy of the regulator is
the polar opposite. Here, shadow banking is as active as it can get (λ′ =1−λ).
Figure 2 depicts the two local maxima in this case c.
If q is sufficiently large (small) holding qf constant, then λ (λ) is the global
optimum. The broad intuition is that if it is sufficiently highly likely that the
bank will not be active in the shadow sector, then imposing a tight leverage that
fully unleashes shadow banking with only a small probability is preferable to
a high leverage.
4.2.3 The ex ante impact of adverse selection in equilibrium. For an
arbitrary regulatory leverage λ, adverse selection in the shadow-banking sector
has an unclear ex ante impact because it reduces the amount of cash raised
by the bank, but increases risk transfer per dollar raised. I now study the
impact of adverse selection at the equilibrium regulatory leverage determined
in Proposition 3. Adverse selection in the shadow sector is larger when the
private-value motive to trade is smaller - q smaller so that a bank is less likely
to trade because it has a good opportunity, and when the common-value motive
to trade is larger - p smaller so that the bank is more likely to try and sell a
lemon. I am interested in how p, q affect social surplus via their impact on
shadow banking activity. Thus, the proper comparative-statics analysis is that
in which changes in p, q affect social surplus when imperfect enforcement
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Figure 2
Surplus in Proposition 3 case c
makes shadow banking possible, while leaving social surplus unchanged in the
case of perfect enforcement studied in Section 3, in which shadow banking is
not allowed.
To carry out such an analysis, I introduce compensated changes in (p,q)
as follows. A compensated change in q is a shift in parameters from (q,f )
to (q ′, q
q ′ f ). This way the probability that a bank receives a good opportunity
varies, while the ex ante expected return on the alternative investment does
not, so that surplus is unaffected by changes in q ′ under perfect enforcement.
In particular, the optimal regulatory leverage under perfect enforcement λ∗ is
unchanged. Similarly, a compensated change in p is a shift in parameters from
(p,k,l) to (p′,k′,l′) such that
pl = p′l′,
k(1−p)l = k′(1−p′)l′.
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This way the probability that the portfolio is of high quality varies, while the
expected payoff and the expected adjustment costs under perfect enforcement
do not. In particular λ∗ is unchanged.
Proposition 4. A compensated reduction in either p or q (higher adverse
selection) leads to an increase in total surplus under imperfect enforcement
whereas, by construction, it does not affect surplus under perfect enforcement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The broad intuition for this result is the following. The negative consequences
of adverse selection in the shadow sector—a reduction in price that increases
risk transfer per dollar raised—is not important in equilibrium precisely because
the regulatory leverage is chosen such that it does not matter ex post. Decreases
in p and q are perhaps best interpreted as switches from “good times” to
“bad times,” when expectations about bank assets quality are more pessimistic,
and returns on alternative investment opportunities are more dispersed. Thus,
the model predicts that the social costs of regulatory arbitrage in the shadow
banking sector are more important in “good times.”
5. Discussion and Extensions
5.1 Inefficient regulation and efficient shadow banking
Thus far I have studied the benchmark of a benevolent rational planner who
sets a constrained efficient capital requirement. It is not surprising that shadow
banking can only lead to a reduction in social surplus in this case. It is interesting
to study shadow banking in the alternative situation in which
λ∗ ≥λ,
but in which the regulatory leverage is λ<λ. That is, this corresponds to the
situation in which the efficient regulation is sufficiently loose so that it will
not trigger any shadow banking activity, whereas the implemented one is too
tight and spurs shadow banking. This may stem from, for example, the fact that
prudential regulation cannot be fully contingent on economic conditions, and
is therefore too tight in good times.
In this context, one may wonder whether social surplus is larger under
imperfect enforcement than if shadow banking is prohibited. I study this
question using compensated comparative statics in q. That is, I let q vary
but suppose that the return function is of the form q0
q
f , where q0 is fixed. Thus
changes in q do not affect the equilibrium under perfect enforcement.
Proposition 5. If q is sufficiently close to one (low adverse selection), then
surplus is higher if enforcement is imperfect than if it is perfect. If q is
sufficiently close to zero (high adverse selection), then the opposite holds
true.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is that the shadow banking sector is desirable in the sense
that it helps the bank sidestepping an inefficiently tight capital constraint, but
that it does so inefficiently by transferring more risk than necessary per dollar
raised because of adverse selection. Which effect dominates depends on the
magnitude of adverse selection.
It is interesting to contrast this result with that in Proposition 4. When
regulatory leverage is optimally chosen, then adverse selection is desirable
because it reduces the volume of shadow activity. When it is not, adverse
selection reduces social surplus because the shadow banking sector restores a
more efficient effective leverage ratio at the cost of important risk transfers.As a
result, if one believes that the rise of the shadow banking sector is motivated by
inappropriate capital regulations, then one should want informational problems
in this sector to be as small as possible, for example, through reforms of OTC
markets. If one believes, on the contrary, that shadow banking is meant to
sidestep a broadly efficient prudential regulation, then one should prefer to
maintain some opaqueness.
Finally, the result that unleashing shadow banking may be desirable when
capital requirements are perceived as too tight may help understand the 2004
decision by U.S. regulators to set the deconsolidation of ABCP conduits
mentioned above as a permanent exemption.
5.2 Alternative sources of illiquidity in the shadow banking sector
Adverse selection is a natural source of date-1 illiquidity in a shadow sector
that refinances information-problematic assets in opaque and unregulated OTC
markets. In this particular setting, with only two bank types, adverse selection
costs are linear. The reader may worry that this linearity drives the key result
that endogenous increases in shadow leverage more than offsets decreases in
regulatory leverage. This may no longer be true with strictly convex transaction
costs in the shadow sector. To assess this, suppose now that there is no adverse
selection at date 1: the bank does not know anything about the portfolio that the
MMF does not know. However, there are costs associated with secret trading,
so that the sale of a claim λ′l in the shadow banking market generates only
pl
∫ λ′
0
δ(x)dx,
where δ≤1 is a decreasing function. In other words, there are convex costs
from trading in the shadow banking sector.
Assuming q = l =1 and L=I for notational simplicity, the bank now chooses
to sell a fraction λ′ of its portfolio so as to solve:
max
λ′∈[0,1−λ]
{
p(1−λ−λ′)+p
(
λ+
∫ λ′
0
δ
)
+f
(
p
(
λ+
∫ λ′
0
δ
))}
.
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Ignoring the constraint λ′ ∈ [0,1−λ], the first-order condition with respect to
λ′ is:
1+f ′
(
p
(
λ+
∫ λ′
0
δ
))
=
1
δ(λ′) . (15)
Risk transfer in the shadow banking sector more than offsets the risk reduction
due to tighter capital requirements when
dλ′
dλ
≤−1.
From (15),
dλ′
dλ
≤−1⇐⇒ δ
′ (λ′)
(δ(λ′))2 ≥pf
′′
(
p
(
λ+
∫ λ′
0
δ
))(
1−δ(λ′)),
which holds if, other things being equal, the absolute value of δ′ is sufficiently
small and that of f ′′ sufficiently large. The increase in marginal trading costs
must be sufficiently small relative to the decrease in marginal investment
returns.
5.3 Hidden leverage and hidden risk: A theory of excessive asset
encumbrance
In this setup, the bank transfers risk to the household in a concealed fashion
through hidden leverage, but it cannot alter the risk profile of its portfolio.
Risk-adjusted leverage increases in the presence of shadow banking only
because leverage increases. An interesting extension is that in which risk-
adjusted leverage also increases because the shadow banking sector induces
an endogenous increase in the risk profile transferred to the household. I sketch
a simple version of it here. Suppose the bank has two assets: a “safe” (but not
risk-free) one and a “risky” one. The safe asset pays off L with prob. P and zero
otherwise. In this latter case of default, the risky asset pays off zero as well,
whereas it pays off l with prob. p conditionally on the safe asset performing.
Suppose
L=pl.
Under perfect enforcement, it is clearly optimal that the bank issues a claim
backed by the entire safe asset, and by part of the risky asset if it is not enough,
which I assume. This minimizes risk transfer for a given amount of cash
raised. Under imperfect enforcement, the bank would then possibly refinance
an additional tranche of the risky asset with the MMF.
Suppose now that the regulator, unlike the other agents, cannot tell apart the
safe and the risky asset. Then the bank would prefer to swap the role of these
assets. That is, it would prefer to sell its entire risky asset in the formal banking
sector together with part of the safe one, and a bigger residual fraction of the
safe one in the shadow banking sector. This is because adverse selection is
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not a problem in formal banking because the bank can pool over future types,
whereas it is one in the shadow banking sector. The bank therefore prefers to
save the least information-sensitive asset for shadow banking activity, where it
matters. But then, not only does shadow banking increase leverage on assets,
it also increases the risk profile transferred to the household because of asset
substitution.
Such an asset substitution strongly relates to the current debate about
excessive asset encumbrance or “run on collateral” (see, e.g., BIS, 2013). The
concern is that banks may now use too much of their high-quality assets as
collateral in their shadow banking refinancing activities, leaving too few high-
quality assets unencumbered to back the unsecured claims (including deposits)
in their general balance sheet.
It is interesting to note that this extension and the baseline model have
different predictions regarding the quality of the assets that are refinanced
in the shadow sector relative to the unconditional quality of the asset class.
In the baseline model, the probability of default of a portfolio conditionally
on being refinanced in the shadow sector is higher than the unconditional one
(r <p). In this extension, on one hand, it is still the case that a bank that has no
valuable alternative investment and a good portfolio does not tap the shadow
sector, resulting in a higher proportion of lemons in the shadow sector. On the
other hand, the assets that are refinanced in the shadow sector have a lower
conditional probability of default than the average unconditional probability
of default, because banks use their best collateral in the shadow sector. If this
latter effect dominates, then it may be that the assets that are refinanced in the
shadow sector have a lower probability of default than those that are not.
6. Conclusion
This paper builds a theory of the prudential regulation of banks on the premises
that the shareholders of banks, unlike those of other firms, internalize only a
fraction of the social cost of default on their liabilities. This in turn stems from
the specific role of bank liabilities as media of exchange.
I first write a model of bank regulation with perfect enforcement that
formalizes this idea in a tractable and simple fashion. I then introduce imperfect
enforcement in this framework by simply assuming that the regulator cannot
monitor all the markets in which bank assets are refinanced with money-like
liabilities. The small, but important, difference between the regulated markets
and the unregulated ones is that banks can commit to a financing policy before
they receive private information about their assets in the former, whereas they
trade ex post optimally once informed in the latter.
As a result, shadow banking is plagued by adverse selection and formal
banking is not. The model yields clear-cut predictions on the ex ante impact
of the informational frictions in the shadow banking sector. If regulation is set
optimally, then adverse selection is desirable because it acts as a commitment
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device for banks to have a more limited shadow banking activity. The optimal
leverage in the presence of shadow banking is closer to that under perfect
enforcement if adverse selection is more severe. If regulation is inefficiently
tight, then adverse selection is costly because it induces banks to offload more
risk than necessary in the shadow banking sector to bypass excessive capital
requirements.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the household has a realized date-2 wealthW2 and the entrepreneur
made an initial capacity choice N1. Without loss of generality, one can restrict
the analysis to subgames in which
−l≤W2−N1 ≤ l.
This is because it cannot be optimal that the household bears more risk than
the total risk of the portfolio. It also cannot be optimal for the entrepreneur to
adjust capacity almost surely in one direction.
Suppose that W2 ≥N1. Then the entrepreneur chooses N2 ∈ [N1,W2] so as to
maximize
N2 (1−c)− k(N2−N1)
2
2
.
This is because given a capacity N2, it is clearly optimal to set the unit price to
one. Condition (2) implies that N2 =W2 is optimal.
Suppose now that W2 <N1. The entrepreneur now chooses N2 ∈ [W2,N1] so
as to maximize
W2−N2c− k(N2−N1)
2
2
,
because it is optimal to charge a unit price W2
N2
in this case. Condition (2) implies
that N2 =W2 is optimal. Here, we implicitly assume that W is sufficiently large
so that the entrepreneur’s profit is always positive.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, the entrepreneur chooses N1 so as to maximize
(1−c)E (W2)− kE
[(W2−N1)2]
2
.
It is therefore optimal to set
N1 =E (W2).

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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Inspection of (7) shows that μ∗ =1 is optimal, and condition (8) stems from the
first-order condition w.r.t. λ in (7). Condition (3) implies that the solution to
(8) is smaller than one. Because λ∗pl+L−I must be strictly positive from the
Inada condition at zero, it must be that the loan can be financed when leverage
is λ∗.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, it is easy to see that it is optimal that a bank always pledges its entire
risk-free cash flow L at date 1. The design of the optimal security therefore
boils down to determining the fraction of the risky cash flow l that each date-
1 type of bank sells to the household at date 1. I denote P as the random
variable that describes the net payoff to the household for a given mechanism
and Q∈{G;B} as the type of the portfolio. The total variance formula viewed
from date 0 writes
V ar (P )=E (V ar (P |Q))+V ar (E (P |Q)).
Suppose first that all types pool at date 1. For some fixed λ∈ [0,1], all types
issue a claim λl against their risky cash flow sold at the price λpl. The net
payoff to the household is{ −λpl if Q=B
(1−λ)pl if Q=G ,
so that
E (V ar (P |Q)) = V ar (P |G)=V ar (P |B)=0,
V ar (E (P |Q)) = V ar (P )=p(1−p)λ2L2.
I now show that any other mechanism such that a bank with a good portfolio and
a valuable investment opportunity raises at least λpl implies a larger variance
V ar(P ). Suppose that a mechanism is such that a bank with a good portfolio and
no valuable alternative investment raises an amount of cash πn at date 1 against
a claim to λnl, whereas a bank with a good portfolio and a valuable investment
opportunity raises πi ≥λpl against a claim λil. The key remark is that a bank
with a bad portfolio always mimics the contract that raises the largest amount.
Thus, the payoff to the household if the portfolio is bad is deterministic, equal
to
−max(πi;πn)≤−λpl.
Because the household accepts each security (i,n) only if he breaks even for
each of them, it must be that he breaks even ex ante, so that
E(P |G)≥ (1−p)λl.
This implies
V ar (E (P |Q))≥p(1−p)λ2L2.
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Because in addition
E (V ar (P |Q))≥0
for any set of securities, this establishes the result.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
An inspection of (10) shows that constraint λ′ ≥0 binds for λ≥λ and so does
constraint λ′ ≤1−λ for λ≤ λ̂.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 5
It is easy to see that the respective date-0 utilities of the bank and the
entrepreneur in the presence of shadow banking are
UB = pl+L−I +qf
((
λp+λ′r
)
l+L−I),
UE = W (1−c)− k(1−p)l
2
2
[
pλ2 +rλ′2 +2rλλ′
]
.
For λ∈ [̂λ,λ], condition (10) implies that these utilities become
UB = pl+L−I +qf (ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
),
UE = W (1−c)− k(1−p)2p
⎡⎢⎣
(
ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L
)2
+ p−r
r
(
ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L−λpl
)2
⎤⎥⎦,
and the result follows because λ≤λ implies that ϕ
(
1−p
pq
)
+I −L−λpl is
positive.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
a. Condition (12) means that λ∗ ≥ λ. This implies that the shadow banking
market is inactive at λ∗, which therefore still is the optimal leverage.
b. Utilities (16) and (16) imply that total surplus varies as follows when
λ describes
[
0,̂λ
](notice that this set may be empty). It admits an interior
maximum λ , which solves
qf ′ ((λ(p−r)+r)l+L−I )=λk(1−p)L
if pk̂λ>1 and is maximal at λ̂ otherwise.
Condition (13) thus implies that social surplus is increasing w.r.t. λ over[
0,̂λ
]
. It also implies that λ∗<λ, so that social surplus decreases w.r.t. λ over[
λ,1
]
. Lemma 5 implies that surplus also increases w.r.t. λ over
[̂
λ,λ
]
. Thus,
surplus is maximal for leverage λ. Shadow banking is inactive but is a threat
that benefits the bank and overall reduces surplus because λ>λ∗.
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c. Otherwise, if pk̂λ>1, then λ as defined above in (6) also corresponds to
a locally maximum total surplus together with λ. To see that λ<λ∗, notice that
for all λ<1,
λ(p−r)+r >λp.
Thus it must be that λ, which solves (6), and λ∗, which solves (8), satisfy:
λ < λ∗,
λ(p−r)+r > λ∗p,
this latter inequality means that the bank is better off under λ than under λ∗.
Finally, I show that either local optimum can be global. Notice that as q
varies, while f is scaled so that qf remains constant, then λ and λ̂ vary, while
λ∗ and λ do not. In particular, as q→0, then λ→λ∗< λ from (6), and λ is
therefore the global optimum. When q increases so that pk̂λ↓1, then λ↑ λ̂,
and λ is the global optimum from Lemma 5.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the optimal leverage isλ∗ ≥λ.Acompensated reduction inq leaves
λ unchanged, whereas a compensated reduction in p reduces it, so that optimal
leverage is still λ∗, and social surplus is not affected by such compensated
variations in p, q.
Suppose that the optimal leverage is λ. Then surplus is, up to constant terms,
qf (λpl+L−I )− k
2
p(1−p)l2λ2.
Again, a compensated reduction in q does not affect surplus. A compensated
reduction in p reduces λ, which increases surplus because λ>λ∗. Perhaps
surplus becomes even higher by choosing the other local maximum with full
shadow banking activity.
Suppose that the optimal leverage is λ. Then surplus, up to constant terms,
is
qf
((
λ
(
1− r
p
)
+
r
p
)
pl+L−I
)
− k
2
(1−p)pl2
(
(1− r
p
)λ2 + r
p
)
, (A.1)
with
qf ′
((
λ
(
1− r
p
)
+
r
p
)
pl+L−I
)
=k(1−p)lλ. (A.2)
Differentiating (A.1) w.r.t. r
p
using the envelope theorem yields
qf ′
((
λ
(
1− r
p
)
+
r
p
)
pl+L−I
)
(1−λ)−k(1−p)l(1−λ2),
which is negative from (A.2). Further,
r
p
=
q
1−p+pq
increases w.r.t. q, p. Perhaps, surplus becomes even higher by choosing the
other local maximum without active shadow banking.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
The respective social surplusses under perfect and imperfect enforcement are:
Sperf ect = q0f (λpl+L−I )− k2p(1−p)l
2λ2,
Simperf ect = q0f (λpl+L−I )− k2p(1−p)l
2
(
λ
2
+
p−r
r
(
λ−λ)2).
Denoting
(λ)=Sperf ect −Simperf ect ,
one has 
(
λ
)
=0, and
′ (λ)=pl
⎡⎢⎢⎣−q0f ′(λpl+L−I )+k(1−p)lλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+k(1−p)l p−r
r
(
λ−λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
⎤⎥⎥⎦,
where A<0 because leverage λ is strictly lower than λ∗, and B>0. The only
term that q affects is
p−r
r
=
(1−p)(1−q)
q
,
which decreases from +∞ to 0 as q spans (0,1). Thus, for q sufficiently large
(small), (λ)≤ (≥)0.
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